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The following article is an edited version of a paper prepared by IDRC 
partner José Maria Fanelli of CEDES (Centre for the Study of State 
and Society) in Argentina. It in turn is based on results of a research 
project supported through IDRC’s Globalization, Growth and Poverty 
(GGP) program, which was recently published as “Macroeconomic 
Volatility, Institutions and Financial Architectures” (José María 
Fanelli, editor, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 
 
The International Crisis and the Gloomy Expectations 
about Future Growth 
 
The world is undergoing the worst financial turmoil in decades. 
Many observers argue that the size and severity of the disequilibria 
are comparable to those that followed the 1929 stock market crash. 
It is no wonder, then, that expectations about the evolution of the 
global economy are gloomy. Indeed, pessimistic expectations have 
become a problem per se. Bad expectations about the evolution of 
the real economy are feeding into the current value of assets, 
impeding the stabilization of stock prices and the restoration of 
credit. 
 
What can be done to combat gloomy expectations? Two steps are 
both urgent and important; first, restore liquidity and overcome the 
credit crunch in advanced economies so as to dampen the effects on 
the global economy; and second, to implement counter-cyclical 
policy packages to reduce the risks of a painful global recession. 
 
The authorities in developed countries will surely act aggressively 
on the fiscal, monetary, and financial fronts. However, since the 
crisis is global, national efforts must be coordinated if they are to be 
effective. Looking at the way in which the global economy 
overcame the recessionary forces at work in earlier crises, it is clear 
that developing countries were key. This suggests that preserving 
growth in emerging economies is decisive to avoiding the risk of a 
global economic collapse. 
 
Financial Crisis, Volatility and Institutions: the 
Experience of Emerging Countries 
 
In the last two decades, financial shocks – either external or 
domestic – have had a strong deleterious effect on growth in 
emerging countries. The following set of features has been typically 
present in financially troubled emerging countries. 
 
• Misguided macroeconomic policies and/or weak financial 
regulations and supervision, which resulted in excessive external 
exposure, have raditionally played a central role in nurturing 
financial disequilibria. 
 
• Emerging countries have a limited institution-building capacity 
and it is very difficult to preserve good policies and rules under 
volatile conditions and political turmoil. One particularly negative 
effect of crises is the destruction of institutions, making it very 
difficult to re-build the regulatory infrastructure under volatile 
conditions. 
 
• Financial disarrays have been extremely costly from the fiscal and 
political points of view. The fiscal imbalances provoked by the 
bailout of the banking system eroded public debt sustainability. 
Furthermore, crisis-related fiscal expenditures crowded out social 
and public investment expenditures, affecting development and 
political legitimacy. 
 
• Via credit crunch, financial stress has always caused strong output 
losses and reduced investment. Key in this regard has been the 
inability to conduct appropriate fiscal and monetary policies in a 
context in which capital flows behaved counter-cyclically, driven 
by sudden changes in risk aversion and domestic de-leveraging. In 
addition, the resources that international financial institutions (IFIs) 
provided to counterbalance capital outflows and ease the credit 
crunch did not suffice to significantly smooth aggregate 
fluctuations. More often than not, the conditionality attached to the 
funds did not help, either. 
 
• The simultaneous occurrence of financial and real shocks (for 
example, interest rate and terms of trade shocks) compounded the 
size of growth collapses. 
 
• The overall stability of world capital markets was never seriously 
jeopardized by emerging countries’ instability. Consequently, 
troubled economies perceived the global economy as an opportunity 
to overcome the downturns that accompanied national/regional 
crises. In particular, a number of countries adopted a “mercantilist” 
stance aimed at recovering growth by boosting exports and 
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In light of these stylized facts, the spread of the current financial 
turbulence to emerging and less developed countries is raising 
serious concerns. One additional source of uncertainty is that the 
crisis has novel characteristics. In contrast earlier analysis 
considered that financial instability was primarily a national 
problem, rooted in policy and institutional flaws and, consequently, 
that problem should be addressed domestically. 
 
A good number of emerging countries gave serious consideration to 
this diagnostic and acted accordingly. First, they made substantial 
efforts to strengthen financial regulations and supervision. Second, 
macroeconomic policies were considerably streamlined. Steps were 
taken to increase the independence of the central bank and to 
implement fiscal responsibility laws aimed at containing public 
debt. Third, to face sudden capital stops and create room for anti-
cyclical responses, emerging countries have been accumulating 
reserves and creating sovereign funds. These efforts were rewarded. 
In the years that preceded the sub-prime crisis, risk premia fell and 
some bonds were re-classified as investment grade. 
 
The strategy based on sounder macro fundamentals and domestic 
institutions plus self-insurance seemed to work well and, in such a 
context, efforts to improve the international financial architecture 
faded. Then the current crisis hit the coasts of emerging economies, 
revealing that international coordination and cooperation were 
necessary after all. It is no wonder, then, that there are strong 
demands to restructure the international financial architecture 
institutions in order to address the global imbalances and regulatory 
problems in a coordinated way. 
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Coordination Failures and the Policy Challenges Ahead 
 
These stylized facts suggest that future global growth will depend 
on the ability to coordinate counter-cyclical policies with the reform 
of the international financial architecture and pro-growth policies. 
Among the most relevant international coordination failures that 
could jeopardize financial stability and growth in developing 
countries the following deserve consideration. 
 
First, self-insurance can be self-defeating. The current crisis is 
associated with global imbalances which are probably not 
independent of self-insurance strategies. That is, the fear of sudden 
stops may have helped create a savings “glut” in some key 
emerging economies and induce excessive consumption and 
bubbles in certain developed countries. In addition, an excessive 
supply of loanable funds may have endogenously induced a 
relaxation of monetary policy and of the supervision of credit 
markets. In the 1990s, a distressed country could rely on the world 
economy to foster its post-crisis economic recovery via exports. If 
emerging countries hit by the financial turmoil followed this 
strategy all together in the near future, it would worsen international 
trade conditions. The disincentive to mercantilist, beggar-thy-
neighbour policies calls for international coordination. 
 
Second, fast growth in emerging economies in recent years has been 
greatly favoured by exports of manufactures in the case of Asia and 
of natural resources in the case of Africa and South America. The 
sustained growth in exports, in turn, has been facilitated by the 
evolution of aggregate demand and imports in the US economy. 
The current crisis strongly indicates that the post-2001 global 
growth dynamics had been unsustainable. The emphasis on exports 
as the engine of growth in emerging countries will have to be 
complemented with stimuli for domestic absorption. But more 
domestic absorption means lower current account surpluses and, 
ceteris paribus, lower reserve accumulation and less reliance on 
self-insurance against external shocks. The reforms in the 
international financial architecture will have to allow developing 
countries to achieve the same level of hedging against global risks 
with lower reserves. It is necessary, then, to organize an efficient 
network of arrangements to supply short-term facilities for 
emerging countries facing liquidity constraints. This should 
embrace not only an appropriate reform of the IMF but also the 
mobilization of the funds of surplus countries and the organization 
of regional pool arrangements. 
 
Third, it should be noted that the current global imbalances are 
associated not only with pitfalls in financial regulations and 
monetary policies, but also with pronounced and long-lasting 
changes on the real side of the global economy. The most salient are 
the sharp changes in productivity and international competitiveness 
(China, India), in relative prices (oil and natural resources), and the 
world’s sources of savings and effective demand (USA). 
 
Monetary policies and the adjustments in exchange rates in the 
developed world were not efficient enough to facilitate the 
correction of global imbalances, if we are to judge by the results. 
Policy and regulatory decisions were mainly made at the center of 
the global economy but they also affected the periphery. It seems 
only natural that emerging countries demand a greater involvement 
in the decision-making process. This, of course, calls for voice and 





The protection of world growth is vital to avoid a painful global 
depression. Just-in-time facilities should be made available to 
prevent credit crunch and facilitate counter-cyclical fiscal and 
monetary actions aimed at sidestepping serial downturns in the 
developing world. Since the problem is global, these facilities 
should not be circumscribed to “strategic” emerging economies and 
the conditionality should both provide incentives to adopt sound 
policies and protect economic activity. In this sense, the recent steps 
taken by the IMF and the Fed to preserve the liquidity of financial 
markets in key emerging economies are only first steps in the right 
direction. The extended facilities should not be circumscribed to 
short-run liquidity problems and should not overlook non-strategic 
countries. To this purpose, institutional mechanisms should be 
designed to mobilize the resources of countries that are generating a 
structural surplus. 
 
Policy decisions oriented to correcting the existing global 
imbalances must consider the effects on the developing world. This 
is particularly relevant with respect to exchange rates and initiatives 
to restore liquidity conditions in the global markets. Developing 
countries must be able to participate in the groups and institutions 
that seek to coordinate international decisions in accordance with 
their significance among the global sources of growth. 
 
It is time to tackle the issues of international reserves creation and 
of designing efficient multilateral arrangements for the provision of 
international liquidity. Lack of success in providing this global 
public good will result in suboptimal, probably unstable, 
unilateral/regional solutions. In particular, this is central for 
emerging countries to avoid inefficient strategies of self-insurance. 
A dysfunctional IFA creates incentives for the authorities to follow 
“mercantilist” strategies and manipulate exchange rates. 
 
Feedback effects between volatility and institutions will continue to 
haunt developing countries. This is why policy actions should seek 
to minimize the negative effects of the global turbulence on the 
institutional infrastructure that supports financial intermediation in 
developing countries. The reforms of the international financial 
architecture must be coordinated with the reforms of the domestic 
financial architecture. 
 
Institutional reconstruction is far more difficult in emerging 
economies and recommendations about standards and codes will 
not be enough; developing countries need a blueprint and 
appropriate strategies for institution building and enforcement. It is 
central to take into account the idiosyncratic features of emerging 
economies: the types of shocks that normally hit the economy, the 
degree of volatility, the quality of the overall institutional 
framework, and political constraints. 
 
Finally, it must be kept in mind that political legitimacy matters for 
institution building. Macro volatility in developing countries will 
probably increase as a consequence of the international crisis. 
Volatility will reflect on domestic absorption and consumption, as a 
result, poor people will get poorer. Stabilization policies must be 
accompanied with more efficient and well-founded safety net 
mechanisms, and mobilizing resources for development must be 
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